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The authors have just finalised a systematic review on the
effects on re-offending of custodial and non-custodial
(«alternative») sanctions (Villettaz, Killias, & Zoder, 2006). Since
the mid-19th century, it was common knowledge, if not a dogma,
that short-term imprisonment is «damaging» because, in the words
first coined by Bonneville de Marsangy and later copied by von
Liszt and many others, incarceration for shorter periods does not
last long enough to «cure» criminal propensities (seen as a kind of
a disease), but still too long to avoid first-time offenders to be
exposed to the risk of contamination by hard-core criminals
(Kuhn, 2000). Based on this quasi-medical theory of criminal
contamination, von Liszt and many others ever since have
stimulated the development of sanctions that do not imply custody,
such as suspended sentences, probation, fines and later community
work and electronic monitoring. Simultaneously and rather
ironically, the same movement has also stimulated long-term
incarceration and even incapacitation for offenders considered as
sufficiently «sick» to warrant long-term «cures» in confinement.
All these trends have been stimulated by the idea to offer better
«alternatives» to custody, i.e. to reduce re-offending through more
efficient «alternative» sanctions. Many such programs have been
evaluated over the last decades world-wide, usually with results
that confirmed the superiority of non-custodial over custodial
sanctions. 
Keeping these backgrounds in mind, the Campbell
Collaboration Crime and Justice Group invited the authors to start
a systematic review of the evidence on whether or not custodial or
non-custodial sanctions are more effective in preventing re-
offending. This essay will give a resume of the methods and
results of this meta-analysis. We shall conclude with an overview
on how future evaluations of new sanctions and programmes
could be made more convincing.
The effects of custodial vs non-custodial sanctions on reoffending:
Lessons from a systematic review
Martin Killias and Patrice Villetaz
University of Lausanne (Switzerland)
Based on a systematic review of some 23 (out of 300 originally located) studies, it is concluded that
most studies show lower rates of re-offending following a non-custodial compared to a custodial sanc-
tion. However, this outcome may be biased because, in most quasi-experiments of this kind, subjects
with the worst prospects of rehabilitation are likely to be sent to prison. In a meta-analysis limited to
five randomised controlled trials and one natural experiment, it is concluded that custodial and non-
custodial sanctions do not differ significantly in terms of re-offending. Lessons from this review in-
clude, in view of future evaluations, the need to increase randomised controlled trials, to use broader
measures of re-offending and rehabilitation, to look at long-term effects, and to deal with possible
Hawthorn effects. Equal rates of re-offending do not mean that «nothing works» or «nothing matters»,
but that criminal justice policies should not be based on the belief that short-term confinement will be
damaging.
Los efectos de las penas privativas vs no privativas de libertad en la reincidencia: lecciones de una re-
visión sistemática. En una revisión sistemática de 23 estudios se concluye que la mayoría de las in-
vestigaciones muestra una tasa más baja en la reincidencia de los delincuentes condenados a cumplir
una condena alternativa a la prisión, comparados con los que son condenados a penas de reclusión. No
obstante, esta estimación puede estar sesgada, debido al hecho de que los sujetos que tienen el peor
pronóstico de rehabilitación son los que suelen ingresar en prisión. En un meta-análisis que realizamos
de cinco estudios que incluían diseños experimentales con asignación al azar, más un experimento na-
tural, obtuvimos el resultado de que las condenas de reclusión y las penas alternativas no difieren de
modo significativo en cuanto a la reincidencia. El artículo a continuación deriva algunas conclusiones
de la investigación, entre las cuales se citan las siguientes: la necesidad de aumentar el número de ex-
perimentos con asignación al azar, emplear medidas más inclusivas de la reincidencia y la rehabilita-
ción, y estudiar los efectos de las sanciones a más largo plazo .Que se obtengan tasas iguales de rein-
cidencia no significa que «nada funciona», sino que la política criminal no debería asumir que,
necesariamente, la reclusión breve en la cárcel tendrá efectos negativos en el interno.
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Method
What is custodial? What is non-custodial?
According to the protocol, the systematic review was to include
world-wide published or unpublished studies conducted between
1961 and 2002 where some form of «non-custodial» sanction has
been compared, in terms of re-offending, with «custodial»
sanctions. For pragmatic reasons, sanctions were considered
«custodial» whenever they were imposed by a judge, as a form of
punishment (with or without «treatment»), thus excluding pre-trial
detention and arrest policies (e.g. in connection with domestic
violence), and whenever they implied some form of confinement
in a closed residential setting. Sanctions were considered «non-
custodial» whenever they did not imply deprivation of liberty.
According to our pragmatic definition, «boot camps» or sentences
implying deprivation of liberty in a closed therapeutic setting have
been considered as «custodial», whereas community work,
electronic monitoring, financial or suspended sanctions
(probation) have been considered as «alternative» or «non-
custodial». Given the large international differences in crime
policies, but also changes since the 1960ies in character and
typologies of prisons and other sanctions, we are aware of some
difficulties in this respect. Practically, however, we guess that the
number of studies on sanctions at the margin of what one might
consider «custodial» or not was not particularly large. More
serious was the heterogeneity of «alternative» sanctions, since this
concept included sanctions as different as community service,
probation, fines and electronic monitoring. The only common
denominator was that all these sanctions did not involve
deprivation of liberty. We are aware that this is a questionable
category. On the other hand, it is certainly not irrelevant for
assessing the claim that confinement is damaging per se. Finally,
the duration of custody and «alternative» sanctions can vary
considerably, whereas virtually all studies included compared any
«alternative» to rather short prison terms. Again, this is not a
problem in a context where the century-old claim has always been
that short-term confinement is damaging. But we recognise that
one may legitimately question whether longer prison terms are
equally (or more or less) damaging (a question addressed by the
meta-analysis by Smith, Goggin, & Gendreau, 2002). To be
eligible, studies had also to offer some results on re-offending,
however measured.
The quality of studies
A far more difficult choice was to select studies according to
methodological quality. Originally, we had in mind to consider
only randomised or natural experiments and quasi-experiments
where important intervening variables had been controlled for that
went beyond what one usually finds in criminal records (such as
number and kind of previous convictions and offences, plus age
and gender); in particular, we thought that a certain number of
studies might have considered also education, employment record
and drug or alcohol abuse history. To our surprise, we rapidly
realised that there were only four randomised controlled trials, one
natural experiment (van der Werff 1979, 1981), but, despite
hundreds of studies, almost no quasi-experiments where these
additional requirements had been satisfied. This led us to abstract
in full some 50 studies (out of 3,000 screened abstracts and some
300 studies that seemed, at first sight, relevant to our review), but
to select only 23 for our systematic review. 
This selection process raised a difficult choice between internal
and external validity. Meta-analyses and systematic reviews are
designed to overcome limitations to external validity of studies
whose scope has been limited in time and space, as is the case of
virtually all randomised controlled trials. On the other hand, the
internal validity of most quasi-experiments is highly questionable
in this field, since judges or correctional officers who have to
decide whether a defendant is to serve his sentence in prison or in
any «alternative» arrangement are regularly told, either by law or
internal guidelines, to consider the defendant’s risk of re-offending
or, as often phrased, his «need» for treatment. In assessing such
risks, they typically pay attention to many individual
characteristics that go far beyond what they may find in a criminal
record, namely his employment record, the family situation, his
substance abuse history and many other variables that are typically
hard to measure, including intuition. These factors are, later, again
typically related to recidivism. In evaluations where, as usual,
subjects with the worst prediction records were systematically sent
to prison, while all others were eligible for an «alternative», re-
offending will, almost by necessity, be more frequent among those
serving their sentence in confinement. As observed by Walker,
Farrington & Tucker (1981) 25 years ago, such differences (in
favour of non-custodial sanctions) typically vanish the more
independent variables are being controlled. Since such controls
rarely include variables beyond what can be found in criminal
records, as mentioned, much variance in re-offending regularly
remains unexplained, often beyond 70 and up to 80 percent, a fact
that points to a wide array of uncontrolled factors in recidivism. In
a situation like this, including in a meta-analysis quasi-
experimental studies whose outcomes tend to be systematically
biased in one direction will likely reproduce the same bias. If
systematic reviews increase external validity, they should
obviously not achieve this at the costs of internal validity.
Therefore, it has been decided to restrict the meta-analysis to four
randomised controlled experiments and the one natural
experiment whose internal validity seems beyond doubt. 
Results
If all the 23 studies with at least 4 control variables were
«counted», the result was clearly favourable to non-custodial
sanctions. In 11 out of 27 possible comparisons, re-offending was
significantly more frequent after a custodial sanction, whereas the
opposite outcome was observed only in 2 cases. Thus, the «vote
count» method clearly favoured «alternative» sanctions over
imprisonment. 
In the case of the meta-analysis, however, no significant mean
standardised effect size has been observed, although the trend has
been slightly in favour of «alternative» sanctions again. 
Only one among the selected studies (Killias, Aebi, & Ribeaud,
2000) contained information on rehabilitation beyond re-
convictions, such as employment or substance abuse history or
family constellations. It did not confirm claims that short custodial
sanctions negatively affected subjects’ integration at work or in
the family. 
This result does not necessarily mean that «nothing works» or
that «nothing matters». It simply means that custodial and non-
custodial sanctions do not differ very much in their effects on re-
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offending, and that claims about «damaging» effects of short-term
confinement may have been overstated. For policy-makers, this
result is rather good news in the sense that they can choose
between custodial or non-custodial sanctions based on other
considerations. For example, «alternative» sanctions may be less
expensive or, as in the case of community work, more beneficial
to the community in other respects. On the other hand, custodial
sanctions may have symbolic functions (in terms of higher
«equity» and «equality») that are not necessarily involved in
«softer» responses, a fact that may have its bearing in connection
with domestic violence or traffic offences. 
Finally, it may be important to keep in mind that all this holds
for short-term imprisonment, i.e. sentences of a few weeks or
months. Long-term deprivation of liberty may have effects that go
far beyond what has been observed in the selected studies. 
Discussion
Our systematic review of studies having compared re-
offending rates following custodial and non-custodial
(“alternative”) sanctions has allowed to identify a number of
shortcomings that might be relatively easy to overcome in the
future, no matter in what country an «alternative» program is to be
evaluated. Such lessons will be paid due attention to in the
following discussion.
Increasing the number of randomised controlled trials 
Looking at evaluations in Europe in the field of criminal
justice, the first and most obvious conclusion concerns the lack of
controlled experiments that, for the time being, remain rare
exceptions, often promoted by dedicated researchers or policy
makers who, for whatever reasons, are committed to «objective»
results rather than to «proof» that their policies worked. The result
of this situation is the impossibility to draw firm conclusions about
the effects of custodial vs. non-custodial sanctions, despite
hundreds of evaluations conducted world-wide over this question
(Smith, Goggin, & Gendreau, 2002; Villettaz, Killias, & Zoder,
2006). Therefore, randomisation should become a far more
acceptable, if not the standard option for policy makers who
mandate evaluations of any new forms of treatment or sanction.
The obstacles that are routinely invoked are far less absolute than
often claimed (see a similar problem about present counter-
terrorism intervention in Lum, Kennedy & Sherley, 2008). Once
the number of randomised experiments will increase, researchers
and policy makers will probably learn how to overcome legal and
ethical obstacles in acceptable ways —everything is, in the end, a
question of how rather than of whether controlled trials can be
conducted.
It is common to invoke ethical reservations whenever a
randomised controlled experiment is being envisaged. Such
arguments seem to be quite odd as long as no evidence has shown
that «new» sanctions or programs produce better results than
traditional ones, or that they are at least not damaging. No one
encourages pharmaceutical firms to sell new «promising»
products before adequate testing through randomised controlled
trials. Why should a new correctional program be «sold» to
participants as long as its effects have not been adequately tested,
simply because a few correctional specialists argue more or less
convincingly that it may most likely be beneficial? If, as usual,
new programs are first implemented on an «experimental» basis
rather than large-scale, the argument that refusing the new
alternative to certain subjects (those in the control group) is
unethical, sounds strange as long as their fate is to serve the
standard program: implicitly, such an argument implies that most
convicts are subject to «damaging» treatment —an obviously
unethical option if we knew that this is the case. 
Our experience with correctional services, convicted offenders
participating in new programs and policy-makers has been that
random assignment has many advantages also for staff and
decision-makers operating in the field, despite some evidence in
the literature to the contrary (Erez, 1985). Therefore, random
assignment may often be easier to justify than any kind of choice
on the grounds of personal characteristics, merits or institutional
constraints, particularly if the number of candidates exceeds the
planned capacity of the experimental group (Weisburd, 2000). 
Serious practical problems are likely to arise whenever
practitioners are highly committed to a program, as they should be
(Petrosino & Soydan 2005), and if random assignment is rigidly
applied without due consideration of practical concerns. There are
often programs that are designed only for the treatment of
individuals having certain characteristics. In such cases, it is good
practice to screen subjects to assess their eligibility, as for example
in the case of the Sozialtherapeutische Anstalten in Germany
(Ortmann 1994, 2000). Even if this offers practitioners the
possibility to eliminate subjects not suitable from the treatment
group, they may have strong reservations whenever a «particularly
needy» subject is being assigned to the control group (Little,
Kogan, Bullock, & van der Laan, 2004). In order to defend the
trial’s integrity, an excellent method, already suggested by Wilkins
(1969), is to admit a certain (pre-fixed) number of subjects before
any randomisation takes place. In the case of the Swiss community
service vs. prison experiment, social workers were allowed to
admit up to 25 percent of subjects before (i.e. without)
randomisation. These subjects were, of course, not comparable to
the two randomised groups. For this reason, they were kept
identifiable and analysed separately. In the end, this procedure
reduced temptations to «cheat» during randomisation (and, thus,
increased the experiment’s integrity), increased acceptability of
randomisation among practitioners, and prevented covert
opposition to the trial, as in the case of the Kingswood Training
School described by Cornish (1987).
In some countries, it may be wise to remove legal obstacles by
appropriate legislative actions. For example, the Swiss parliament
adopted, in 1971, an amendment to the penal code allowing the
Government to introduce, on an experimental basis, i.e. for a
limited number of offenders and for a limited period of time,
innovative sanctions and correctional arrangements beyond those
provided for by the penal code. Under this law, offenders who are
offered the chance of serving their term in an «innovative»
program may, at any time, refuse and claim to be treated
«according to the law» (i.e. serving their term in prison, as a rule);
however, no one is entitled to claim to become part of an
experiment that is, by essence, limited in scope. Although this law
removes legal obstacles precluding randomisation among those
who volunteer and are eligible for an «experimental» sanction or
program, it does not impose randomised controlled trials either,
and it lasted more than 20 years before such a design has been first
adopted. In other countries, too, new sanctions are, as a rule,
introduced as a temporary and more or less «experimental»
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arrangement. Therefore, controlled experiments should not be less
feasible under such conditions. 
Looking at long-term effects
No less deplorable than the lack of randomised trials is the fact
that, whatever the method adopted, follow-up periods in
evaluations rarely extend beyond two years, presumably because
policy makers need rapid «feed-backs». However, randomised
experiments make longer observation periods far more feasible. If
subjects were, originally, randomly assigned to different
conditions, their development over their entire life-span can be
studied without undue investment in time and resources. Quasi-
experiments, however, will never allow assessing long-term
outcomes that were not anticipated, such as unforeseen health
problems. If, for example, subjects in the treatment group suffer
later in their lives more often than those in the control group of
cardiovascular problems, as observed in the case of the Cambridge
Somerville experiment (McCord 1990), it would, without
randomisation, not be possible to rule out that, from the onset,
candidates with more vulnerable health had been assigned
disproportionately to the treatment group. Probably due to the
unpopularity of randomisation, studies conducted so far in Europe
never have extended to significant parts of subjects’ later
biographies. In European countries where population mobility
(particularly across national and language barriers) remains
relatively modest, long-term studies could be particularly
fascinating given the availability of many data in official records
over extended periods of time. This is the case in many European
countries, although the best known example certainly is Denmark
where huge databases covering entire biographies can be matched.
Brennan & Mednick (1994) have used such records to study re-
convictions in an entire birth cohort (born at Copenhagen between
1944 and 1947). Currently, the data of the Swiss community
service vs. prison experiment are being re-analysed at our institute
in the light of subjects biographies ten years later.
Beyond official records as measures of «success» or «failure»
Despite alternative (and presumably more valid) measures of
re-offending (such as self-reports), most studies do not include
measures of re-offending beyond re-arrest or re-conviction. Given
the strong correlation between offending and victimisation, one
might also validly consider, in evaluation research, a combination
of self-report and victimisation questionnaires in order to assess
effectiveness of programs. If a program is indeed successful at
reducing offending rates, one should also be able to identify such
an effect through reduced rates of victimisation. This is not trivial,
since questions on victimisation often provoke less resistance than
self-report instruments. A methodological study on some 500
subjects (Aebi, 2006) has documented a reasonably high validity
of all three methods to identify program effects on the prevalence
of offending. 
Looking at relative improvement
In most studies, re-offending has been measured through the
prevalence of post-intervention re-convictions or re-arrests. Left
alone that questionnaires of self-reported delinquency and/or
victimisation were rarely used, the simple prevalence (“yes/no”)
of arrests or convictions after an intervention may mask important
variations in the frequency of offending (“incidence rates”) and
relative improvement following different sanctions (Little, Kogan,
Bullock, & van der Laan, 2004). Depending on the population
studied, convictions are not necessarily frequent and may,
eventually, not allow observing sufficient variance in order to
discover any sanction (or intervention) effect, especially if the
sample is not large. This is particularly true under the continental
sentencing system where one global sentence is imposed for all
(new) offences the defendant has been found guilty of, rather than
one sentence for each verdict, as under the Anglo-American
system. If re-arrest data are used, this problem is less serious
because police contacts are more frequent than re-convictions, one
court appearance being eventually related to several new offences
known by the police. However, survey data systematically allow
to observe far higher rates of re-offending than any official
measures (Aebi, 2006). 
Some studies have shown that most offenders reduce offending
rates after whatever type of intervention (Empey & Lubeck 1971;
Killias, Aebi, & Ribeaud, 2000). Thus, the relevant question may
be to what extent they improve differently by type of sanction.
Therefore, it would be urgent to look in future studies at rates of
improvement (or reductions in offending) rather than merely at
«recidivism» as such. This is particularly true if samples are not
very large, if «failure» rates are not very high (or not very different
across groups) and if, as not unusual in such situations, subjects’
pre-intervention offending rates were, despite randomisation,
higher in one group compared to the other. By comparing pre-
with post-intervention incidence rates (e.g., number of offences
known to the police during two years before and after the
intervention), statistical power can be increased under such
circumstances. Increasing the sample size is not always possible
for practical reasons, or produces adverse side effects, such as
reducing the «dosage» of treatment (Weisburd, Petrosino, &
Mason 1993). 
Looking at rehabilitation beyond re-offending
In studies comparing custodial and non-custodial sanctions,
lower re-offending rates among those sentenced to an
«alternative» sanction were, whenever observed, usually
attributed to the fact that these offenders were not separated from
their work and family life and may have had, therefore, better
opportunities to integrate after having served their sentence.
However, the evidence is extremely limited in this respect (Lamb
& Goertzel 1974, Killias, Aebi, & Ribeaud 2000) and does not
necessarily confirm this assumption, since almost all studies focus
on re-offending (Israel & Chui, 2006). Given the often extremely
short duration of custodial sentences compared to «alternative»
sanctions under European law, it seems unlikely that any lasting
«prisonisation» effect may have been produced. In the case of
randomised controlled trials, it would be easy to conduct later
follow-up studies including, beyond measures of re-offending, any
kind of indicators of social integration, as they can routinely be
found, for example, in the files of income revenue services. The
files of such services routinely collect data on family disruption,
unemployment, welfare payments, debts, revenues and resources.
Such data would be highly relevant in assessing any negative long-
term effects on integration of custodial compared to «alternative»
sanctions, or of any other types of programs. Such data are
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currently being used in two randomised experiments in
Switzerland. They are also an attractive alternative to data
collected through interviews, given the usual difficulties in
locating and motivating subjects many years after their
correctional experience. As the few available examples of long-
term evaluations show, one important advantage of controlled
trials is precisely the possibility to consider later outcomes in areas
that no one had anticipated to be causally related to the
intervention at steak. 
Hawthorn or placebo effects and double blind trials
To the extent that, in randomised controlled trials, lower re-
offending rates have been observed after «alternative» compared
to custodial sanctions, it should not be ruled out that this outcome
could be the result of a Hawthorn or placebo effect. Indeed,
persons convicted to a custodial sanction who get the «chance» to
serve it under the form of an «alternative», i.e. usually without
having to go to prison, or who are placed in a «special» treatment
unit within confinement, are offered, in some way, a second (often
unexpected) chance which, in turn, may favourably affect their
attitudes (as observed by Killias, Aebi, & Ribeaud 2000). A
placebo effect has also been envisaged by the authors of the ISSP
trial in England, where the experimental group showed moderately
lower overall re-offending rates (Little, Kogan, Bullock, & van der
Laan, 2004). Subjects in an experimental group may, whenever
treatment means avoiding prison or any other unwelcome
experience, typically develop the feeling of having been treated
«better than expected» —or with more «fairness». As experiments
on cooperation between unrelated individuals (Fehr &
Rockenbach, 2003) have shown, sanctions perceived as fair do not
affect subjects’ willingness to cooperate, whereas sanctions
resented as unjust or unfair destroy altruistic cooperation almost
completely. That sanctions perceived as «fair» (in practice, this
probably equals «better than expected») increase willingness to
cooperate, matches similar results on reduced rates of re-offending
as a result of attitude change. Such outcomes have been observed
in studies on attitudes influenced by cognitive-behavioural
treatment (Henning & Frueh, 1996; Vennard, Hedderman, &
Sugg, 1997) or by «fair» procedures (Paternoster, Bachman,
Brame, & Sherman, 1997). 
In the medical field, the obvious answer would be to organize
double-blind trials. For obvious reasons, double-blind experiments
are not feasible in the field of criminal justice where the nature of
«treatment» cannot be concealed to subjects. It is surprising,
however, that the possibility of such effects has, so far, found very
little attention in the criminal justice literature. One way of
assessing possible Hawthorn (or placebo) effects might be to look
at subjects’ development over longer periods of time, although this
way may not necessarily allow distinguishing such effects from
vanishing treatment outcomes. If, however, innovative
«alternatives» —irrespective of what they are or what they
imply— consistently produce better outcomes than more
traditional sanctions, it may be fair interpreting such outcomes as
a Hawthorn (or placebo) effect. 
Concluding remark: the role of evaluations in policy making
If —as often observed in randomised controlled trials and again
in case of the present meta-analysis— rates of re-offending are
similar no matter what intervention subjects were assigned to,
many think the money invested in the experiment had been
wasted. Such a view is inappropriate, since an inconclusive
outcome does not imply that «nothing works» or «nothing
matters». Rather, similar outcomes after carefully evaluated
interventions allow researchers and policy makers to validly
conclude that effects of all options compared are similar. For
policy makers, such an outcome means that the choice between
programs can be based on considerations beyond their
effectiveness, such as relative costs, availability of resources,
fairness and equity to offenders and victims, consistency in
sentencing, and popularity among defendants and the public. In
this sense, striving for evidence-based crime prevention policies,
as advocated by the Campbell Collaboration Crime and Justice
Group (Welsh & Farrington, 2005), means that policy-makers will
know better what they can expect in adopting solutions or policies
whose effects have been documented through meta-analyses based
on carefully designed experiments. One immediate policy
implication may be that short-term prison sentences should no
longer be replaced by whatever «alternative» in the name of their
«damaging» effects on re-offending. Such policies have been
conducted throughout Europe over several decades, with the
unanticipated consequence that short prison terms have often been
replaced by longer sentences. The result often have been
dramatically increasing incarceration rates. Portugal and Spain are
particularly worrisome examples of this trend (Kuhn, 2000).
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